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SELF AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
Sorabji (R.) Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality,
Life, and Death. Pp. xii + 400. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Cased,
£25. ISBN: 0-19-926639-5.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001881
The remarkable historical and philosophical range of S.’s book is re·ected in its title:
focussing on ancient conceptions of human individuality, self-awareness and personal
identity (especially in Greek and Roman philosophy, with some detours in Eastern
traditions), S. touches upon various ways in which these themes were discussed by
some key μgures in the subsequent history of philosophy, drawing some implications
of  these ‘ancient and modern insights’ for our conception of  life and after-death
destiny.
Although S. does not aim at exhaustiveness, and o¶ers us a broad-brush map of the
main ideas and arguments involved, the breadth of his treatment makes a detailed
summary, let alone critical discussion, of his lengthy book impossible. I shall limit
myself to highlighting some especially interesting and problematic proposals.
The opening Part 1 is devoted to the ‘existence of self and philosophical
development of the idea’. Against those who, by his account, deny the existence of a
single self (e.g. some Buddhists, Hume, Nietzsche, Parμt) or give an exceedingly
‘thin’ account of it (e.g. Plato, Descartes, Locke), S. argues that some form of
awareness of the self (‘to see the world in terms of me and me again’, p. 22) is needed
because of its survival function both in personal and in evolutionary terms; we must
identify the self with the embodied owner of psychological and physical states and
events rather than with an ‘ownerless’ ‘stream’ or ‘bundle’ of such states and events
(vs Parμt) or ‘an undetectable soul or immaterial ego’ (vs Plato and Descartes).
Although ‘this need is no proof of existence’, S. believes ‘it does create an onus of
disproof’ on those who claim that its object is illusory (p. 22). S. proceeds to argue
against the scholarly view that interest in selfhood is missing from early Greek
philosophy; he surveys the ways in which the persistence of individuals over time
was denied (e.g. by Epicharmus, according to whom material bodily change over
time implied a loss of identity) and defended (e.g. by the Stoics), and the ‘true self ’
was variously identiμed with an impersonal rational soul or intellect (in the Platonic
tradition [cf. Part 3, Chapter 6]), practical reason (Aristotle), or ‘will’ (Epictetus).
This part sets the tone and pace for the whole book, re·ecting its strengths and
weaknesses. S. touches upon an astonishing variety of ancient and modern authors,
texts and arguments, with a refreshing personal voice, backed by a perceptive use of
a large amount of literature. The price paid for this breadth is, at times, some lack of
depth in exegetical and philosophical analysis. With few exceptions, for example, the
primary texts are paraphrased and summarised rather than analysed, and the
sourcebook-style choice of reporting most of them only after his discussion does
not help readers appreciate their richness.
Part 2 is devoted to some ancient and modern discussions of what ensures personal
identity over time, including the Aristotelian and Stoic responses to the
Epicharmus-style ‘Growing Argument’, the Stoic idea that the same individuals (or
counterparts of them) will inhabit future cosmic cycles, the fascinating early Christian
debate on the material constitution of the resurrected body, the role of memory
for personal identity (with focus on Epicureans, Stoics and Locke), and Parμt’s
contention that material continuity, and even identity, do not really ‘matter’. This is
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the high point of the book; S. connects di¶erent strands of the philosophical tradition
and makes ancient and modern philosophers dialogue in fecund and
thought-provoking ways. If anything, we would want to hear more about S.’s own
opinions and reasons, which often are simply stated or roughly sketched rather than
carefully developed and argued. For example, S. claims, matter-of-factly, that ‘our
greater readiness to accept splitting … than … teletransportation’ (p. 89) speaks
against the Parμtian view that physical continuity is not crucial, provided there is
enough psychological continuity between our past and present ‘selves’. This is
surprising: I doubt that, for the sake of physical continuity, the majority of us would
prefer ‘splitting’, i.e. having half of our brain (with only a portion of our
psychological states and capacities) transplanted into a di¶erent body, over
‘teletransportation’, i.e. having our whole body (brain included) annihilated and a
brand new one, made of numerically distinct particles of matter but with exactly the
same psychophysical features, instantly recreated by a machine somewhere else. This
reviewer would deμnitely opt for the latter option, like generations of Star Trek fans
who are not disturbed by their heroes’ presumed loss of personal identity in virtually
every episode (here S. seems to come as close to Epicharmus as Parμt is to Hume, and
it is di¸cult to argue that he is thereby in better company). This raises a more
stringent question concerning S.’s style of argument: are our ordinary intuitions
about personal identity and survival conclusive evidence for or against philosophical
theories of the self ? I am not suggesting that they can not be, but some preliminary
re·ection on this methodological issue would be needed.
After discussing the idea that individuals are bundles of properties and some
ancient proposals concerning their di¶erentiation (Part 3), S. devotes Part 4 to the
emergence of the notion of ethical personae in μrst-century B.C. Stoicism, to
Plutarch’s suggestion that we constitute ourselves through memory, and to Epictetus’
identiμcation of the true self with our inviolable ‘will’ (proairesis). S. competently
touches upon an array of fascinating texts and ideas, but the danger of imposing on
the ancient material such an ill-deμned concept as that of ‘self ’ emerges at times. For
example, in On tranquillity 473b–474b Plutarch does not seem to me to claim, or even
suggest, that painstaking exercise of memory and self-re·ection is crucial to constitute
our own self, or even our own persona; it will make our present life better, i.e. more
tranquil and self-su¸cient, by weaving it in a uniμed whole.
Part 5 discusses some ancient puzzles concerning the possibility and origin of
self-knowledge and self-awareness (one noticeable absence is the ‘Elusive Argument’
used against the Stoic conception of sagehood). S.’s proposal that, independently of
its mechanism, self-awareness must come from natural selection, given its survival
function, is puzzling: countless vegetal and animal species have been most successful
in evolutionary terms in the absence of self-awareness (unless we weaken this notion
to such an extent as to make it irrelevant here), so S. needs to explain why things di¶er
for the human species.
In Part 6 S. engages more closely with Parμt’s idea that we are streams of
psycho-physical events occurring in a body, and that speaking of owners of these is a
mere façon de parler: the payo¶ of this realisation will diminish selμshness and fear of
the (supposed) ‘loss of self ’ at death. S. outlines a battery of arguments against this
reductionist view: ownerless streams cannot be univocally uniμed or di¶erentiated,
and agency and moral responsibility presuppose continuing owners. These arguments
deserve careful scrutiny that I cannot undertake here (e.g. does Parμt’s position really
imply that ‘I-thoughts’ should be abandoned, or considered illusory?). What I μnd
less convincing is S.’s alternative: what is exactly the ‘embodied owner of
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psychological and physical states’? We are told that it is not an immaterial soul, but in
what sense then is it something over and above those states and body? What kind of
‘ownership’ is S. postulating? I am not claiming that no convincing answer can be
given, but that S. fails to tackle these and other fundamental questions. The μnal
chapter of Part 6 is an overview of some sophisticated Buddhist attempts to reduce
the self to psycho-physical streams, or even eliminate it.
The μnal Part 7 discusses some ways in which our selves have been supposed to
enjoy after-death survival (reincarnation, disembodied survival, resurrection, circular
time), outlining conceptual di¸culties for all (e.g. what kind of life could a
disembodied self have?) and examining whether, anyway, it is rational to feel dismay
at the prospect of not surviving. S.’s protreptic suggestion is that, although not
rationally justiμed (as some Epicurean arguments show), such a fear is ‘programmed’
into us by natural selection; philosophy cannot ‘remove it, but it can keep it in check
and prevent it from growing’, improving the quality of our lives, which is what really
matters (p. 341).
S.’s book is an inspiring example of how one can do philosophy and history of
philosophy in the same breath, and a reminder of the rewards and di¸culties of
such an enterprise, especially when it is carried on with as ambitious a scope as S.’s.
While S. has the merit of o¶ering us a reliable large-scale map of a vast and
fascinating philosophical terrain, he does not always succeed in constructing a
uniμed narrative integrating the various historical and philosophical threads he
identiμes. This might suggest that no such single story can be told, because there is
no uniμed perspective on the ‘self ’ to be distilled from the texts; however, at least an
attempt to tackle the issue in a general conclusion would have been welcome. S.’s
book is an invaluable mine of texts, ideas, arguments and bibliographical references
on a coherent set of perennial philosophical problems, and will not fail to inspire
readers, who will want to use it as a launch pad for more localised and in-depth
studies. Despite the reservations expressed above, S.’s book commands the attention
of a variegated readership: classicists and students of ancient philosophy will μnd
S.’s constant integration of ancient and modern perspectives refreshing and
stimulating, philosophers will gain from a better sense of the historical dimension
of certain familiar concerns, ideas and arguments, and non-specialists will be
introduced to the wonders and challenges of (the history of ) philosophy through the
distinctive voice of an original intellectual.
Durham University LUCA CASTAGNOLI
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ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS
Broadie (S.) Aristotle and Beyond. Essays on Metaphysics and
Ethics. Pp. x + 203. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007. Cased, £45, US$85. ISBN: 978-0-521-87024-5.
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In view of the order of the twelve articles that make up this μne collection, the title is
slightly misleading: it is not a progression from Aristotle to beyond but rather from
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